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RECENT BOOKS
BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAw 1776-1836. By Elizabeth
Gaspar Brown. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Law School.
1964. Pp. xiv, 377. $7.50.

The all-too-short bookshelf on American legal history has been
expanded slightly in quantity and substantially in quality by this
unique study. More than thirty years ago, when Professor Morris
issued "a challenge to American legal scholarship to rescue the law
of the British colonies in North America from the obscurity in
which it had long lain" 1 with the first edition of his Studies in the
History of American Law, that edition itself was almost the only
title to be placed on a reference list for such a project. Between the
date of his first edition in 1930 and the lectures of Professor Ames on
legal history (mostly British) in 1913,2 hardly anything had been
published on the subject, unless one broadens the definition to
include such related works as Warren's earlier history of the bar
in America,3 his history of the Supreme Court,4 and biographies such
as Beveridge's study of John Marshall. 6
In the past three decades, although one could not describe it
as a mounting flood, the trickle of scholarship in legal history has
slowly broadened into a credible rivulet, and at least it is flowing
more strongly. The several volumes of American Legal Records
published through the Littleton-Griswold Fund of the American
Historical Association6 will stand comparison with the hallmark
works of the Selden Society. The original study of Goebel and
Naughton on criminal procedure in New York Colony7 proved
to be an invaluable antecedent to Professor Goebel's landmark
edition of the recently published first volume of Alexander Hamilton's legal papers.8 The prospective publication of the first volume
of the new Supreme Court History under the auspices of the Oliver
Wendell Holmes Devise of the Library of Congress and the forthcoming Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution
I. MORRIS, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw, p. iii (2d ed. 1959).
2. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL EssAYS (1913).
3. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR (1911).
4. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (rev. ed. 1937).
5. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (2d ed. 1944).
6. COUNTY COURT RECORDS OF ACCOMACK-NORTHAMPTON, VIRGINIA 1632-1640 (Ames
ed. 1954); PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND COURT OF APPEAIS 1695-1729 (Bond &: Morris
ed. 1933); COURT REcoRDs OF KENT CouNTY, DELAWARE 1680-1705 (de Valinger ed.
1959); THE SUPERIOR COURT DIARY OF WILLIAM SAMUEL JOHNSON 1772-1773 (Farrell ed.
1942); RECORDS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF SOUTH CAROLINA 1671-1779 (Gregorie
ed. 1950); SELECT CASES OF THE MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY (Morris ed. 1935);
THE BURLINGTON COURT BOOK (Reed &: Miller ed. 1944); RECORDS OF THE VICE-ADMIRALTY
COURT OF RHODE ISLAND 1716-1752 (Towle ed. 1936).
7. GOEBEL&: NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK-A STUDY IN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1944).
8. THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALExANDER HAMILTON (Goebel ed. 1964).
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under the auspices of the National Historical Publications Commission9 are also substantial contributions to this long-neglected
field.
Historically the American people have had, as one scholar puts
it, a "highly instrumental attitude toward law," which "reflected the
depth and spread of change in our development, the pressure of events,
the preoccupation with economic values and problems and with the
nearest ends--those which people deemed the most practical."10
Tpat socio-economic factors fundamentally affected law, especially
in the context of the frontier, has been skillfully demonstrated by
Professor Blume in his published work,11 and the pragmatic considerations coloring our constitutional practices have been eloquently
--as well as controversially-argued by Professors Crosskey and
Haines. 12 Here and there, special studies of environmental or internal
influences on our legal institutions have also appeared. 13 But the
list, taking all of these together, is still much too short to do justice
to the many facets of the subject.
Assuming, although not conceding, that the study of legal
history has some "practical" usefulness to the contemporary profession and the modern law curriculum, a case in point is certainly the
role of the common law in American jurisprudence. The author
of what is already acknowledged as a modern classic on its subject
has written:
"For the long haul, for the large-scale reshaping and growth
of doctrine and of our legal institutions, I hold the almost
unnoticed changes to be more significant than the historic key
cases, the cumulations of the one rivaling and then outweighing
the crisis-character of the other. If the nature of case law
growth and adjustment were the subject of the present study
(as it is not), I should even be arguing with detail and persistence
that in the main the difference between the great judgments
which become leading cases and various equally striking judgments (they are so many!) which have sunk into obscurity lies
largely in the massing around the former of these little "insig9. Cf. Dunlap's report on the Supreme Court history, and Cushman's report on the
Documentary History, respectively, in The Quarterly Legal Historian, March 1963,
p. ll; and id., March 1962, p. 3.
10. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW-THE LAW MAKERS 4 (1950).
II. TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN, 18051836 (Blume ed. 1935-40); Blume 8: Brown, Territorial Courts and Law, 61 MICH. L.
R.Ev. 39, 467 (1962-63); Blume, Legislation on the American Frontier, 60 MICH. L. REY.
lll7 (1962), and related papers cited there.
12. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
(1953); HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GoVERNMENT AND
PoLmcs, 1789-1835 (2d ed. 1960).
Ill. HURST, LAW AND THE CoNDmoNs OF FREEDOM IN THE NINEI'EENTH·CENTURY
UNITED STATES (1956); JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS (1954); WRIGHT, AMERICAN
INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW (2d ed. 1962).
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nificant" applications which first built them in and then built
them up and thereafter built them out into unsuspected range
and into a strength which never was their own." 14
The fact is that the role of the common law in our history, legal
and general, has been a tripartite one: The first phase consists of the
period and the process of "receiving" the English common law into
the colonies and, in the newly established states, the application of
English common-law rules of construction and decision. This phase
continued well into the nineteenth century but has been diminishing
rather steadily since then. The second phase has been the period
when native legislation, particularly legislation seeking to divest
the jurisdiction of certain rules of the common law which had been
received-e.g., abolition of the Rule in Shelley's Case15-has created
a new frame of reference for the common-law tradition. We are
presently in the third phase, in which a new corpus of statutory
enactments is growing up substantially in derogation of the legislative
developments of the second phase and of the common law as it
adapted to the frame of reference established by the second phase.1 cs
From Llewellyn's study we may proceed to the proposition that
American jurisprudence today is conditioned by the common law
inherited from the first and second phases thus described and, for
the most part, has not become generally aware of the third phase. 17
If we must have some pragmatic application for legal history, then
here is one; for to make each of these three phases of the common law
in America clearly discernible, we need considerably more research
on the first two phases. 18 And this is what makes Mrs. Brown's work
of such fundamental significance. It has brought into focus an important and hitherto generally unnoticed element in the continuity of
English common-law institutions in American life-for, in the
first and second phases which have been suggested above, statutory
materials were essentially related to the common law either because
they were declaratory or in derogation thereof.
British colonial theory-at least in the eighteenth century and
14. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmoN-DECIDING .APPEALS 109 (1960).
15. For specific statutory abolition, cf. ALA. CoDE tit. 47, § 141 (1958); CONN. GEN.
STAT• .ANN. § 47-4 (1958); D.C. CODE .ANN. § 45-203 (1961); FLA. STAT. § 689.17 (Supp.
1963); IowA CODE § 557.20 (1950); MD. CODE ANN. art. 93, § 366 (1957); MASS. GEN.
LA.ws .ANN. ch. 184, § 5 (1955); MINN. STAT. § 500.14 (1945); MISS. CODE ANN. § 835
(1956); Mo. R.Ev. STAT. § 442.490 (1949); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 76-112 (1958); N.H. R.Ev.
STAT. ANN. § 551.8 (1955); N.J. R.Ev. STAT. § 46:3-14 (1937); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 54;
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-04-20 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.16 (1950); s.c.
CODE ANN. § 57-2 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-103 (1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-14
(1959); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3534 (1961); WIS. STAT. § 230.28 (1957).
16. Cf. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. R.Ev. 4 (1936).
17. Cf. LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 14, app. C.
18. Cf. the brilliant illustration of the technique in Llewellyn, On Warranty of
Quality, and Society (pts. 1-2), 36 CoLUM L. R.Ev. 699 (1936) and 37 CoLuM. L. R.Ev. 341
(1937).
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possibly throughout the seventeenth-held that acts of Parliament
did not extend to a British colony unless the act specifically mentioned the colony or the colony specifically incorporated the act
into its own law. Attempts at general incorporation by reference, on
the part of certain American colonies, were disallowed by the crown;
and Mrs. Brown's interesting documentation of these instances
significantly supplements the critical analysis of colonial theories
of British constitutionalism published by Professor Mcllwain forty
years ago. 19 This being the state of affairs, American colonies, and
subsequently American states,20 specifically adopted parliamentary
enactments which offered benefits in many subject-areas (e.g., wills,
waste, uses), which the Americans sought to enjoy within the context
of the English common law.21
Until the history of the common law in the United States was
well into its second phase and the codification movement had
gained ground in a number of states, the British statutes continued
in effect. Unless specifically repealed, in fact, one may presume that
they continue to the present, and with them, in the absence of contrary authority, the guiding precedents of British adjudication. As
the author states in her preface, the period selected for her study
(the first sixty years following independence) was selected in the
interest of unity. 22 One may hope that she will ultimately write a
sequel documenting the survival of particular British statutes in
American legal systems of the present era.
With this hope in mind, one is tempted to single out Part III of
the present volume as the most important and also the most exciting.
Here, the author has assembled dozens of British statutes, from the
reissue of Magna Carta, in 9 Hen. 3 (1225), to an act in the first
year of George III in 1760, with citations of American cases or
statutes which adopted them.23 A bumper crop of separate research
projects-with fields white for harvest and laborers distressingly
few-now can be anticipated from this seedbed. What does this
study of the survival of British statutes in the formative period of
American law suggest, for example, as to the true context of the
American law of wills; or of actions in arrest of judgment or in
execution thereof; or of bargain and sale, the Uniform Commercial
Code notwithstanding?
With this study, we have advanced a measurable distance toward
the state of readiness necessary to take full advantage of the research
19,

BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW

1776-1836, at 1-46 (1964);

MCILWAIN,

THE AMERICAN REvoLUTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 18-147 (1923);
SMITH, JAMES WU.SON-FOUNDING FATHER 43-115
20. Cf. VA. ConE ANN.§ 1-11 (1950).
21. BROWN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 47-200.

22. Id. at x.
23. Id. at 201-355.

(1956).

cf.
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opportunities suggested by Professor Hurst in a paper in 1960: the
study of reciprocal influences of law and socio-economic factors in
periods of major national adjustments, e.g., in the Jacksonian era,
during and after the Civil War, during the "progressive era," and in
the Great Depression.24 Mrs. Brown's work not only provides a solid
foundation for such research, but is a major contribution in itself.
The detailed checklist of British statutes incorporated into American
state law, which comprises Part III and perhaps one-third of her
book, is complemented in Part I with the historical background and
in Part II with a review of the particular method by which the
statutes were adopted in various jurisdictions (the original colonies,
the Northwest Territory, the territory south of the Ohio, and the
Louisiana Territory).
The role of legislation and legislatures in our history is now
being re-examined in terms of what Professor Hurst called "the
inheritance of the legislature" 25-the colonial frustrations in efforts
to secure greater control over local affairs from a distant center of
the empire, which led the revolutionists to vest in their elected
representatives a broad authority. As the present study shows, this
authority was soon exercised, once free of Parliament, to adopt a
number of parliamentary statutes. The westward movement carried
the British statutes with it in many instances.26 And these statutes,
originating in the context of the English common law, maintained
that common-law tradition (the first phase of our common-law
history) until the eve of the Civil War.
The story is indeed a remarkable one; "the use of English statutes
was provided for at an early stage in twenty-six out of the twentyeight jurisdictions organized between 1776 and 1836," writes the
author. "Thus, the potential break with prior legal developments
was averted-there was at least as high a continuity in the use of
English statutes by the several United States jurisdictions as in the
case of the Canadian provinces and territories during the nineteenth
century and the emergent African nations of the twentieth century."27
This is an important pathfinding project which certainly deserves
the attention of the legal profession.

William F. Swindler,
Professor of Law,
Marshall-Wythe School of Law,
College of William and Mary
24. Hurst, The Law in United States History, 104 Paoc. AM. PHILOS. Soc'y 518, 523
(1960).

25. HURST, op. dt. supra note IO, at 23-45.
26. Cf. Blume, supra note 11.
27. BROWN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 44.

